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Abstract Many systems are partially stochastic in nature. We have derived data-
driven approaches for extracting stochastic state machines (Markov models) directly
from observed data. This chapter provides an overview of our approach with nu-
merous practical applications. We have used this approach for inferring shipping
patterns, exploiting computer system side-channel information, and detecting bot-
net activities. For contrast, we include a related data-driven statistical inferencing
approach that detects and localizes radiation sources.
1 Introduction
Markov models have been widely used for detecting patterns [33, 36, 7, 4, 24, 25, 15,
17]. The premise behind a Markov models is that the current state only depends on
the previous state and that transition probabilities are stationary. This makes Markov
models versatile, as this is a direct result of the causal world we live in. Often,
Holcombe Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Clemson University, Clemson,
S.C. 29643-0915
e-mail: rrb@clemson.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
07
57
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
2 S
ep
 20
17
2 R. R. Brooks, Lu Yu, Yu Fu, Guthrie Cordone, Jon Oakley, and Xingsi Zhong
these models can only be partially observed. In that case, we refer to the collective
(observable and non-observable) model as a hidden Markov model (HMM).
Stochastic processes can successfully model many system signals. Some of these
systems cannot be accurately represented using a Markov model or an HMM due
to the uncertainty of input data. One task that benefits from stochastic signal pro-
cessing is the detection and localization of radioactive sources. Since radioactive de-
cay follows a Poisson distribution [22], radiation measurements must be treated as
stochastic variables. A prevalent method for localizing radioactive sources is maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (MLE) [19, 13, 11], we consider bootstrapping the MLE
using estimates from a linear regression model [10].
In Section 2, background information about Markov models is presented, along
with references to our previous work developing the methods presented here. Sec-
tion 3 discusses new developments in the inference of HMMs, detection using
HMMs, methods for determining the significance of HMMs, HMM metric spaces,
and applications that use HMM-based detection. Section 4 analyzes radiation pro-
cesses, maximum likelihood localization, and the use of linear regression to estimate
source and background intensities. In Section 5, closing remarks are presented.
2 Background information and previous work
A Markov model is a tuple G = (S,T,P), where S is a set of states, T is a set of
directed transitions between the states, and P =
{
p(si,s j)
}
is a probability matrix
associated with transitions from state si to s j such that:
∑s j∈S p(si,s j) = 1, ∀si ∈ S (1)
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In a Markov model, the next state depends only on the current state. An HMM is
a Markov model with unobservable states. A standard HMM [14, 28] has two sets
of random processes: one for state transition and the other for symbol outputs. Our
model is a deterministic HMM [26, 24, 29], which only has one random process
for state transitions. Therefore, given the current state and the symbol associated
with the outgoing transition, the next state is deterministic. For each deterministic
HMM there is an equivalent standard HMM and vice versa [37]. This deterministic
property helps us infer HMMs from observations.
Schwier et al. [30] developed a method for determining the optimal window size
to use when inferring a Markov model from serialized data. Brooks et al. [7] found
that HMM confidence intervals performed better than the maximum likelihood es-
timate. This was illustrated through an analysis of consumer behavior. Building on
this work, Lu et al. [40] devised a method for determining the statistical significance
of a model, as well as determining the number of samples required to obtain a model
with a desired level of statistical significance.
3 Markov modeling
3.1 Infering hidden Markov models
HMM inference discovers the HMM structure and state transition probabilities from
a sequence of output observations. Traditionally, the Baum-Welch algorithm [28] is
used to infer the state transition matrix of a Markov chain and symbol output proba-
bilities associated with the states of the chain, given an initial model and a sequence
of symbols. As a result, this algorithm requires the a priori structural knowledge of
the Markov process that produced the outputs.
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Schwier et. al [31] developed the zero-knowledge HMM inference algorithm.
The assumption of HMM inference is (1) the transition probabilities are constant;
(2) the distribution of the underlying HMM is the stationary; and (3) the Markov
process is ergodic. In essence, this means that the system is Markovian, non-periodic
and has a single strongly connected component. The input of the algorithm is a string
of symbols, and the output is the HMM. If the input data are not provided as a set
of strings, but rather as a set of continuous trajectories, then [18] explains how to
change trajectories into symbolic strings.
The original algorithm only requires one parameter, L, as the input, which refers
to the maximum number of history symbols used to infer the HMM state space and
estimate associated probabilities. Take ‘abc’ as an example input string. For L = 1,
it calculates transition probabilities P(a|a), P(a|b), P(a|c), and so on, by creating a
state for each symbol and counting how many times the substrings ‘aa’, ‘ab’, and
‘ac’ occur in the training data and dividing them by the number of occurences of
the symbol ‘a’. The chi-squared test is used to compare the outgoing probability
distributions for all pairs of states. If two states are equivalent, they are merged.
For L = 2, the number of states used for representing conditional probabili-
ties is squared. For example, in a system that has L = 2, it could be the case
that P(c|a) 6= P(c|aa). In which case ‘a’ and ‘aa’ will be different states. The
state space increases exponentially with L, as does the time needed to infer the
HMM. We showed that L can be determined automatically as part of HMM in-
ference. The idea is to keep increasing L until the HMM model stabilizes, i.e.
HMM(L) == HMM(L+1). This data-driven approach finds the system HMM with
no a priori information. Tis process is decribed in detail in [31, 29].
If an insufficient amount of observation data is used to generate the HMM, the
model will not be representative of the actual underlying process. A model confi-
dence test is used to determine if the observation data and constructed model fully
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express the underlying process with a given level of statistical significance [40].
This approach calculates an lower bound on the number of samples required. If the
number of input samples is less than the bound, more data is required. New models
should be inferred with more data and still need to be checked for confidence. This
approach allows us to remove the effect of noise in the HMM inference.
3.2 Detection with HMM
Once the HMM is inferred from symbolized data and passes the model confidence
test, it can be used to detect whether or not a data sequence was generated by the
same process. The traditional Viterbi Algorithm [28] finds the HMM that was most
likely to generate the data sequence by comparing probabilities generated by the
HMMs. For data streams, it is unclear what sample size to use with the Viterbi algo-
rithm. Also as data volume increases, the probability produced by the Viterbi algo-
rithm decreases exponentially, and may suffer floating point underflow [7]. To rem-
edy this, confidence intervals (CIs) are used [7]. With this approach, the certainty of
detection increases with the number of samples and the floating point underflow is-
sues of the Viterbi Algorithm is eliminated [7]. The CI approach can determine, for
example, whether or not observed network traffic was generated by a botnet HMM.
Given a sequence of symbolized traffic data and a HMM, the CI method in [7]
traces the data through the HMM and estimates the transition probabilities and con-
fidence intervals. This process maps the observation data into the HMM structure.
It then determines the proportion of original transition probabilities that fall into
their respective estimated CIs. If this percentage is greater than a threshold value, it
accepts that the traffic data adequately matches the HMM.
Lu et al. [24] used an alternative approach. Instead of estimating transition prob-
abilities and corresponding CIs, they calculated the state probabilities, which are the
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proportion of time the system stays in a specific state, and their corresponding CIs.
Once all state probabilities and CIs were estimated for the observation sequence,
they determined whether each state is within a certain confidence interval. For the
whole HMM, the proportion of states was obtained whose estimated state probabil-
ity matched the corresponding confidence intervals. If an observation sequence was
generated from the HMM, it would follow the state transitions of the underlying
stochastic process that the HMM represents, and its state probabilities would con-
verge to the asymptotic state probabilities if the sequence length was large enough.
Therefore, more states would match their estimated CIs. Generally, a sequence that
is generated by the HMM would have a high proportion of matching probabilities,
while a sequence that is not an occurrence of the HMM will have a low propor-
tion of matching probabilities. Similar to the detection approach in [7], a threshold
value can be set for this proportion of matching states, to determine whether the
observation sequence matches with the HMM.
In [7], receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves were used to find optimal
threshold values. By varying the threshold from 0% to 100% (0% threshold means
we accept everything and we will have a high false positive rate. 100% threshold
means we reject everything and we will have a low true positive rate), they progres-
sively increased the criteria for acceptance. Using the ROC curve drawn from detec-
tion statistics with different thresholds, the closest point to (0,1) was found, which
represents 0% false positive rate and 100% true positive rate. This considered the
trade-off between true positive and false positive rates. Therefore, the corresponding
threshold of that point was the optimal threshold value.
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3.3 Statistically significant HMMs
In [40], we address the problem of how to ensure the inferred HMM accurately
represents the underlying process that generates the observation data. The measure
of the accuracy is known as model confidence, which means the degree to which a
model represents the underlying process that generated the training data. As illus-
trated in Figure 1, model confidence is different from model fidelity, where the latter
refers to the agreement between the inferred model and the training data.
y1 y5y4y3y2 y6
Model
Model
fidelity
Model
confidence
Fig. 1: Hierarchy of the process, observations, and model showing the relationship
between model fidelity and model confidence (adopted from [40]).
Mathematically, we calculate an upper bound on the number of samples required
to guarantee that the constructed model has a given level significance. In other
words, we have shown how to determine within a given level of statistical confi-
dence (α) if a “known unknown” transition does not occur, given two user-defined
thresholds ε and α . The parameter ε determines the minimum probability that tran-
sitions with probabilities no less than ε should be included in the constructed model.
The parameter α is the confidence level that shows the accuracy of the model result.
For each state, s, we use the z-test [5] to determine if the inferred model includes
all transitions with probabilities no smaller than γεs = ε/pis with desired significance
α , where pis is the asymptotic probability of s as the constructed Markov model is
irreducible. Concretely, we test the null hypothesis H0: XUs = γεs against the alterna-
tive hypothesis H1: XUs < γεs , where XUs denote the sample average of the probability
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of an unobserved transaction of state s. We use γεs −XUs as a test statistic, rejecting
the null hypothesis if γεs −XUs is too large. We have not observed the transition,
thereby XUs = 0. We fail to reject H0 if we need to collect more data. Otherwise,
we say that sufficient data has been collected. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis
for all states, the z-test also finds the minimum amount of training samples needed
for transaction transitions with probabilities no smaller than γεs to be detected with
desired level of significance α .
To use the z-test in this manner, we propose a simple algorithm to perform on-
line testing of the observation sequence. The algorithm determines if a constructed
model statistically represents a data stream in the process of being collected. We
first collect a sequence of observation data y of some length D and construct a
model from the collected data. With the constructed model, we determine the z-
statistics and find if the experimental statistic provides 100 · (1−α)% confidence
that a transition with probability ε does not occur. If y is not sufficiently long, we
will be unable to construct a model from the data; additional data should be gathered.
The algorithm is provided in [40].
3.4 HMM metric space
A metric is a mathematical construct that describes the similarity (or difference) be-
tween two models. It is useful to know if two processes are the same, except for rare
events (e.g., events occurring once in a century), since we would typically consider
them functionally equivalent. Eliminating duplicate models can reduce system com-
plexity by decreasing the number of models used to analyze using observation data.
Grouping similar models can increase the number of samples available for model
inference, leading to higher fidelity system representations. To determine if two de-
terministic HMMs G1 and G2 are equivalent, we first let G1 generate an observation
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Fig. 2: Process to remove transitions: (a) original model (asymptotic state probabili-
ties are in square brackets); (b) initial step with Pth = 0.002; (c) removal of absorbing
states; and (d) resulting model with rescaled probabilities. (adopted from [26]).
sequence y of length D and then run y through G2. Using frequency counting, we ob-
tain a set of sample transition probabilities for each transition of G2, denoted by T ′2 .
The probabilities of all outgoing transitions conditioning on each state follow multi-
nomial distribution, which are then approximated by a set of binomial distributions
in this context. This allows us to use the standard χ2-test to compare if the two sets
of transition distributions {T ′2 ,T2} are equivalent with significance α [23], where T2
is the set of transitions probabilities of G2. We define equivalence (G1 ≡ G2) as G1
and G2 accepting the same symbol sequences with a user-defined statistical signif-
icance α . The corresponding algorithm is provided in [26]. Note that, if there does
not exist a path across G2 that yields observation sequence y, we can immediately
conclude that G1 and G2 are not equivalent.
If G1 and G2 are not equivalent, we quantify the distance between them as how
much their statistics differ with significance α . Given a probability 0 ≤ Pth ≤ 1,
we prune all transactions with probability no greater than Pth from both models
and then re-normalize the probabilities of remaining transitions for each state to
obtain two sub-models. The pruning process is illustrated in Figure 2 using a simple
model with threshold value Pth = 0.002. The distance between the two models is
10 R. R. Brooks, Lu Yu, Yu Fu, Guthrie Cordone, Jon Oakley, and Xingsi Zhong
defined as the minimum Pth that yields two equivalent sub-models. To determine this
distance, we progressively remove the least likely events from both models until the
remaining sub-models are considered equivalent. Specifically, starting from Pth = 0,
we prune all transactions with probability no greater than Pth, and then re-normalize
the probabilities of remaining transactions for each state. We gradually increase Pth
and repeat the pruning operation for each Pth until the remaining sub-models are
considered equivalent with the predefined confidence level α . Let d(G1,G2) denote
the statistical distance between G1 and G2, then d(G1,G2) is equal to the stopping
value of Pth. We show in [26] that d(G1,G2) is a metric as it fulfills all the necessary
conditions as a metric.
Since the χ2-test is used, we need to ensure that enough samples (D) are used
for transition probabilities to adequately approximate normal distributions. In order
to approximate the binomial distribution as normal distribution, the central limit
theorem is used to calculate the required sample size.
This is similar in spirit to Kullback–Leibler divergence (KLD); however, unlike
KLD, our approach is a true metric. It does not have KLD’s limitations and provides
a statistical confidence value for the distance. We illustrated the performance of the
metric by calculating the distance between different, similar, and equivalent models.
Compared with KLD measurement, our approach is more practical and provides a
true metric space.
3.5 HMM detection applications
We have used this approach to:
• Track shipping patterns in the North Atlantic;
• Identify protocol use within encrypted VPN traffic;
• Identify the language being typed in an SSH session;
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• Identify botnet traffic;
• Identify smart grid traffic within encrypted tunnels and disrupt data transmission;
• Create transducers that transform the syntax of one network protocol into another
one; and
• De-anonymize bitcoin currency transfers.
3.5.1 Track shipping patterns in the North Atlantic
Symbolic Transfer Functions (STF) were developed for modeling stochastic in-
put/output systems whose inputs and outputs are both purely symbolic. Griffin et
al. [18] applied STFs to track shipping patterns in the North Atlantic by assum-
ing the input symbols represent regions of space through which a track is passing,
while the output represents specific linear functions that more precisely model the
behavior of the track. A target’s behavior is modeled at two levels of precision: the
symbolic model provides a probability distribution on the next region of space and
behavior (linear function) that a vehicle will execute, while the continuous model
predicts the position of the vehicle using classical statistical methods. They col-
lected over 8 months worth of data for 13 distinct ships, representative of a variety
of vessel classes (including cruise ships, Great Lakes trading vessels, and private
craft). The STF algorithm was used to produce a collection of vessel track models.
The models were tested for their prediction power over the course of three days.
3.5.2 Identify protocol use within encrypted VPN traffic
A VPN is an encrypted connection established between two private networks
through the public network. Packets transferred through a VPN tunnel have the
source and destination IP of the private networks, which are not always the final
destination of the packet. The destination IPs for each packet are encrypted and can-
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not be seen by any third party. A typical VPN implementation encrypts the packets
with little overhead and pads all packets in a given size range to the same size. Thus,
the timing side-channel and packet size side-channel can be used to identify the un-
derlying protocol even after encryption. These side-channels are shown in Figure 3.
In [42], a synchrophasor network protocol is identified in an encrypted VPN tunnel.
Packet Size
Packet Arrival Time
L1 L2
L3
Packet Size
Packet Arrival Time
LA LB
LC
t1 t2
t1 t2
Packet Size
Packet Arrival Time
L1 L2
L3
t1 t2
Entering VPN Tunnel
Exiting VPN Tunnel
Fig. 3: Timing and size side-channels in a VPN tunnel.
3.5.3 Identify the language being typed in an SSH session
SSH encryption is mathematically difficult to break, but the implementation is vul-
nerable to side-channel analysis. In an interactive SSH session, users’ keystroke-
timing data are associated with inter-packet delays. In [20], the inter-packet delays
are used to determine the language used by the victim. This is achieved by com-
paring the observed data with the HMM of known languages. In [34], the timing
side-channel is used to extract the system password from interactive SSH sessions.
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3.5.4 Identify botnet traffic
Botnets are becoming a major source of spam, distributed denial-of-service attacks
(DDoS), and other cybercrime. Chen et al [25] used traffic timing information to de-
tect the centralized Zeus botnet. The reasons to use timing information are: (1) inter-
packet timings relate to the command and control processing time of the botnet; (2)
the bots periodically communicate with the command and control (C&C) server
for new commands or new data; (3) the inter-packet delays filter out constant com-
munication latencies; and (4) it does not require reverse engineering the malware
binaries or encrypted traffic data. An HMM is inferred from inter-packet delays of
Zeus botnet C&C communication traffic. Using the behavior detection method with
confidence intervals (CIs) of HMMs [7], they were able to detect whether or not a
sequence of traffic data is botnet traffic. Experimental results showed this approach
can properly distinguish wild botnet traffic from normal traffic.
3.5.5 Identify smart grid traffic within encrypted tunnels and disrupt data
transmission
In a power grid, Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) send measurement data (or syn-
chrophasor data) over the Internet to a control center for closed loop control. Any
unexpected change in the variance of the packet delay can cause instability in the
power grid and even blackouts. PMUs are deployed at critical locations and are
usually protected by security gateways.
The use of security gateways and VPN tunnels to encrypt PMU traffic elimi-
nates many possible vulnerabilities [3, 45], but these devices are still vulnerable to
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that exploit a side-channel vulnerability. In [44], en-
crypted PMU measurement traffic is identified and dropped through an exploitation
of side-channel vulnerabilities. The underlying protocol is detected as described in
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Data Stream
Ping Traffic
Security Gateway 
A Security Gateway 
PMU A PMU B
Ping OpenPDC
VPN Tunnel
(a)
VPN Tunnel
Data Stream
Ping Traffic
Side-
Channel	
Attack
Security Gateway 
A Security Gateway 
PMU A PMU B
Ping OpenPDC
(b)
Fig. 4: An example of a DoS attack in a VPN tunnel: (a) A VPN network carries
Ping traffic and data streams from two PMUs to control center; (b) During a DoS
attack, a PMU data stream within the VPN tunnel is identified and dropped.
Section 3.5.2, and the target protocol’s packets are dropped. The attack leads to un-
stable power grid operations. Figure 4 illustrates such an attack. This attack is tough
to detect because only the measurement traffic is dropped, and all other traffic is
untouched (e.g. ping or SSH traffic). From the victim’s point of view, all systems
works fine, but no measurement traffic is received.
3.5.6 Botnet Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) modeling and detection
Botnets have been problematic for over a decade. In response to take-down cam-
paigns, botmasters have developed techniques to evade detection. One widely used
evasion technique is DNS domain fluxing. Domain names generated with Domain
Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are used as the rendezvous points between botmas-
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ters and bots. In this way, botmasters hide the real location of the C&C servers by
changing the mapping between IP addresses and domain names frequently. Fu et
al. [17] developed a new DGA using HMMs, which can evade current DGA de-
tection methods (Kullback-Leibler distance, Edit distance, and Jaccard Index)[39]
and systems (Botdigger [41] and Pleiades [1]). The idea is to infer an HMM from
the entire space of IPv4 domain names. Domain names generated by the HMM are
guaranteed to have the same lexical features as the legitimate domain names. With
the opposite idea, two HMM-based DGA detection methods were proposed [15].
Since the HMM expresses the statistical features of the legitimate domain names,
the corresponding Viterbi path of a given domain name can be found, which indi-
cates the likelihood that the domain name is generated by the HMM. The probability
returned by the HMM is a measure of how consistent the domain name is with the
set of legitimate domain names.
3.5.7 A covert data transport protocol
Protocol obfuscation is widely used for evading censorship and surveillance and
hiding criminal activity. Most firewalls use DPI to analyze network packets and
filter out sensitive information. However, if the source protocol is obfuscated or
transformed into a different protocol, detection techniques won’t work [43]. Fu et
al. [16] developed a covert data transport protocol that transforms arbitrary net-
work traffic into legitimate DNS traffic in a server-client communication model.
The server encodes the message into a list of domain names and register them to
a randomly chosen IP address. The idea of the encoding is to find a unique path
in the HMM inferred from legitimate domain names, which is associated with the
message. The client does a reverse-DNS lookup on the IP address and decodes the
domain names to retrieve the message. Compared to DNS tunneling, this method
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doesnt use uncommon record types (TXT records) or carry suspiciously large vol-
ume of traffic as DNS payloads. On the contrary, the resulting traffic will be normal
DNS lookup/reverse-lookup traffic, which will not attract attention. The data trans-
mission is not vulnerable to DPI.
3.5.8 Bitcoin Transaction Analysis
Bitcoin has been the most successful digital currency to date. One of the main fac-
tors contributing to Bitcoin’s success is the role it has found in criminal activity.
According to Christin [9], in 2012 the Silk Road (a popular dark web marketplace)
was handling 1.2 million USD worth of Bitcoin transactions each month. This is
largely attributed to Bitcoin’s appeal–pseudonymity, which disassociates users with
the publicly available transactions.
Fig. 5: An example of a Bitcoin transaction found in the public blockchain.
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It is natural to consider financial transactions as a Markovian process since each
transaction is governed solely by previous states. All Bitcoin transactions can be
publicly viewed on the blockchain, as shown in Figure 5. This motivates the notion
that transactions can be represented by a Markov model. However, since Bitcoin
is pseudonymous, there are hidden states that correspond to the Bitcoin users. The
process of grouping the observable transactions with their respective users infers the
underlying HMM.
Theoretically, this HMM would render traditional Bitcoin money laundering use-
less since existing Bitcoin laundering techniques are reminiscent of a shell game1.
Current research is focused on inferring the HMM from the Bitcoin blockchain,
leveraging existing research that identifies transient transactions used for change
functionality [2, 27].
4 Stochastic Signal Processing for Radiation Detection and
Localization
4.1 Radiation Processes
The detection and localization of radioactive sources, especially those that emit
ionizing gamma radiation, is a problem that is of great interest for national secu-
rity [35]. Such a task is not simple due to the physics of radiation signal propagation,
the stochastic nature of radiation measurements, and interference from background
noise. Assuming a uniform propagation medium between the source and location
of measurement, as well as a negligible attenuation due to the medium, a simple
radiation propagation model is given by
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_game
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I =
A
x2
+B, (2)
where I is the total radiation intensity at the measurement location, A is the intensity
of the radioactive source, x is the distance from the source to the measurement loca-
tion, and B is the intensity of the background radiation at the measurement location.
It is evident from (2) that propagation of the signal from a radioactive point
source is governed by the inverse-square law, which states that the intensity of the
signal is inversely proportional to the distance from the source. Figure 6 provides a
visual example of the effect the inverse-square law has on the intensity of a radiation
signal.
Ionizing radiation is commonly measured using scintillation counters, which in-
tegrate the number of times that an incident gamma particle illuminates a scintil-
lation material over a given time period. The number of incidents integrated over
each time period are referred to as ‘counts.’ Due to the physics of radioactive decay,
the measurements of scintillation counters are Poisson random variables [22]. As
a result, single radiation measurements are unreliable since the measurement of a
high intensity source will have a proportionally high variance. An example of the
difference in variance between a high intensity and low intensity signal is given in
Figure 7. Observe that the high intensity signal recorded one meter from the source
has a much higher range of values than the low intensity signal recorded six meters
from the source.
Fig. 6: The intensity of a radiation signal decreases exponentially with distance
when moving through a uniform medium
Pattern detection using Markov models 19
Fig. 7: Real measurements of a 35 µCi Cs-137 source at various distances (IRSS
datasets [21])
4.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Basic radiation detection methods for national security involve the deployment of
one or two sensors in the form of portal monitors located at choke points along the
road. While simple and reliable for detection, the use of portal monitors is not prac-
tical for several locations, such as a widespread urban environment with complex
road networks [6]. Recently, the major focus of research has been on the use of dis-
tributed networks of detectors, which are much more suitable for the detection and
localization of radiation sources over a widespread area. With a distributed detec-
tor network, the detection and localization of radiation sources becomes a complex
problem requiring the fusion of large amounts of stochastic data. One of the most
common fusion methods used for this purpose is Maximum Likelihood Estima-
tion [19, 8, 38].
In short, Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is a search over all possible
parameters of the target radiation source. While the number of parameters depends
on the radiation model, they commonly include the horizontal and vertical coordi-
nates of the source and the radioactive intensity of the source. Each combination of
possible parameters are plugged into a likelihood function, which gives the proba-
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bility that a source with the given parameters cause each detector in the field to have
their current measurements. The parameters that generate the highest likelihood are
selected as the maximum likelihood estimate of the source. An example likelihood
function based on the radiation model in (2) is given by
L(θ) =
Nd
∑
i=1
(
ln Ii
w
∑
j=1
(ci j−1)
)
, (3)
where Nd is the number of detectors being used for the localization, w is the length
of the time window, ci j is the measurement for the ith detector at timestep j, and θ
is the vector of input source parameters, which are used to generate the the intensity
at the ith detector, Ii, using (2). The maximization of the likelihood function is then
given as
θˆml = argmaxL(θ), (4)
where θˆml is the maximum likelihood estimate of the source parameter vector. A
visual example of an MLE localization is shown in Figure 8. Note that the likelihood
function in (3) is a simplification of the logarithm of the joint Poisson probability
for the likelihood of the measurements at each individual detector [11].
The primary criticism of MLE localization is that it is computationally inten-
sive, requiring a brute force search over all parameters. A common method for re-
ducing the total computational load of the MLE search is the use of an iterative
search [13] [8], which allows the large ranges of parameter space to be excluded
from the overall localization. While iterative MLE localization is much faster than
standard MLE search, throwing out large areas of parameter space makes the search
liable to be caught within local maxima [32]. In [11], we proposed the use of Grid
Expansion to mitigate these types of errors. With Grid Expansion, the search area
is expanded by a given percent between each iteration, allowing the MLE search
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(a) (b)
Fig. 8: An example of a low resolution MLE localization: (a) Layout of a detector
field from IRSS datasets [21]. Detectors are blue dots indexed by numbers and the
radiation source is a red dot tagged with an ’S’. (b) A coarse MLE localization has
been performed over the detector field. The center of each grid region was used as
input parameters for (4). The grid region with a red border and a black dot at the
center is the area selected by the search.
to span into areas that would have been thrown out by a standard iterative algo-
rithm. We found that despite a requiring small increase in computation time, the use
of Grid Expansion corrected errors in the situations where the search was getting
caught within local maxima, while maintaining good localization performance in
cases where the error was not occurring.
4.3 Linear Regression
Observe that the radiation propagation model given in (2) is linear with respect to
1/x2. Furthermore, by the law of large numbers, the average of the Poisson dis-
tributed detector measurements over a large time window are representative of the
radiation intensity at their respective locations. Given these two observations, a lin-
ear regression model built using the average detector measurements over a large
enough time window and their distances to the source location may be used to esti-
mate both the source and background intensities, where the slope of the regression
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line is the source intensity estimate and the intercept of the regression line is the
background intensity estimate. Figure 9 shows a linear regression model built using
detector data and their inverse-squared distances to a source location estimate over a
ten second time window. In [12], we use the source estimate from a linear regression
model to successfully detect the presence of a moving source within a distributed
detector field.
Fig. 9: A linear regression model built on average detector measurements vs. their
inverse squared distance to an estimate of the source location. The source and back-
ground intensity estimates are provided by the slope and intercept values of the line,
which are around 3.533×105 counts and 5.258 counts, respectively.
4.3.1 Linear Regression and MLE
One of the difficulties of Maximum Likelihood Estimation is the initialization of
the search over state space. In a real time scenario, it is ideal to use small search
ranges as a means to conserve computational power and keep the localization up to
date with the influx of detector data. While the search area for the position param-
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eters is typically well defined, the search range over the source intensity parameter
is not nearly as obvious and can span a large range of possible values. Furthermore,
an MLE localization requires prior knowledge of the background intensity, B, since
computation of the likelihood function (3) requires the solution of the propagation
model (2). In [10], we show that the source intensity and background estimates pro-
vided by the linear regression model can be used to speed up an MLE localization by
reducing the search range over the intensity parameter and allowing the removal of
detectors from the localization whose measurements are most likely to only include
background noise.
5 Conclusions
In this chapter we highlighted the use of Markov models and stochastic signal pro-
cessing to learn, extract, fuse, and detect patterns in raw data. In Section 3, we
introduced the deterministic Hidden Markov Model (HMM), which is a useful tool
to draw information out of a large amount of data. We described the properties of
HMM’s and highlighted the usefulness of HMM’s for several detection applications.
In Section 4, we described the uses of stochastic signal processing for the detection
and localization of radiation sources. We highlighted the advantages and drawbacks
of localization with Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and described the es-
timation of source and background intensities using a linear regression model based
on detector counts.
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